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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
In their opening brief, Plaintiffs/Appellants (;The Prunedas") present seven issues 
on appeal. Defendants/Appellees ("Columbia Steel") contend that these seven issues 
may be properly distilled down to the following five issues: 
1. Whether the invited error doctrine precludes a party from challenging a jury 
instruction or special verdict form where that the same party drafted and approved 
the instruction and verdict form, only raising objection to either after the jury 
returned its verdict. 
2. Whether a person injured in a car accident is entitled to recover an award of 
general damages that is "substantial/' rather than nominal, where that person has 
received an award of special damages in excess of the statutorily mandated $3,000 
personal injury protection threshold. 
3. Whether the trial court acted within its broad discretion by excluding the injured 
party's treating physician's expert testimony regarding causation of injuries where 
the physician was not designated to give such testimony and where the physician 
did not provide an expert report setting forth his qualifications to testify beyond 
matters of care and treatment or his opinion on such matters. 
4. Whether the trial court acted within its broad discretion by allowing Dr. France, an 
accident reconstructionist and biomechanical engineer, to testify at trial as an 
expert witness where Dr. France relied on materials commonly used by experts in 
the accident reconstruction field. 
5. Whether the trial court acted within its broad discretion when it allowed Dr. 
Clarke, a medical doctor, to testify at trial as an expert witness with regard to the 
appropriateness of care provided by a chiropractor. 
RELEVANT STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Code Section 31A-22-309(l)(a): 
(1) (a) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy 
which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for general 
damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile 
accident, except where the person has sustained one or more of the following: 
(i) death; 
(ii) dismemberment; 
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings; 
(iv) permanent disfigurement; or 
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $ 3,000. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(B) 
(3) Disclosure of expert testimony . . . 
(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure 
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve 
giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the 
witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is 
expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected 
to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, 
including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; 
the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases 
in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Prunedas brought suit against Columbia Steel and Richard Gray to recover for 
injuries incurred in an automobile accident. (R. 1-3.) 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
This case went to trial before a jury in April 2006. (R. 773-775.) Prior to trial, the 
Prunedas moved to exclude the testimony of Columbia Steel's two designated experts: 
accident reconstructionist Dr. Paul France ("Dr. France") and physiatrist Dr. Jayne Clark 
("Dr. Clark"). (R. 114-203.) Columbia Steel also moved to exclude the Prunedas' 
treating physician, chiropractor Dr. Gordon McLean ('Dr. McLean"), prior to trial. (R. 
497-502.) 
After the trial, the jury found the Columbia Steel liable for the Prunedas' injuries 
and awarded $6,083.07 in damages. (R. 699-703.) This damage award included no 
award for general damages, but an award of special damages for each of the Prunedas as 
follows: $4,763.07 for Sergio Pruneda Sr., $220.00 for Anthony Guerrero, $220.00 for 
Donovan Guerrero, $220.00 for Sergio Pruneda, Jr., $220.00 for Cozy Pruneda, $220.00 
for Matthew Pruneda, and $220.00 for Zennia Pruneda. Id After the jury's special 
verdict form was read, the Prunedas objected to the jury instructions on damages and the 
special verdict form. (R. 775 at 284:8-290:12.) 
C Disposition of the Trial Court 
The court denied the Prunedas' motions to exclude Dr. France and Dr. Clark. R. 
464-465.) The court granted Columbia Steel's motion regarding the Prunedas* treating 
physician, Dr. McLean, in part and denied it in part. In its ruling, the court excluded the 
treating physician's testimony relating to causation, but allowed his testimony regarding 
care and treatment. (R. 773 at 40:5-7.) The court also overruled the Prunedas' objections 
to the jury instructions on damages and the special verdict form on the grounds that the 
Prunedas had waived their right to challenge the jury instruction and special verdict 
because the Prunedas themselves had proposed the jury instruction on damage that was 
incorporated into the special verdict form and subsequently failed to raise the issue of its 
potential error at a time prior to the jury returning its verdict. (R. 775 at 284:8-290:12.) 
D, Statement of the Facts 
The Accident 
On July 31, 2002, the Prunedas, Richard Gray of Columbia Steel, and Victor Perez 
were involved in a low-impact rear-end collision. (R. 774 at 247:22-24; R. 774 at 8:15-
19.) The incident began while the three vehicles waited at a stop light at an intersection 
in Pleasant Grove, Utah, Mr. Gray's vehicle being behind Mr. Pruneda's Chrysler 
LeBaron, which was behind Mr. Perez's Chevrolet Nova. (R. 775 at 155:7-12; R. 774 at 
11:12-25.) The light turned green and the three cars began to move forward until Mr. 
Perez's Nova, the first car of the three, suddenly stalled in the middle of the intersection. 
(R. 775 at 156:5-8; R. 774 at 248:21-24.) Although Mr. Pruneda managed to stop his 
LeBaron before touching the Nova in front of him, Mr. Gray was not able to stop his 
vehicle before it made contact with the Prunedas' LeBaron. (R. 774 at 12:4-22.) Mr. 
Gray's contact with the Prunedas' LeBaron pushed it forward where it then made contact 
with the rear of Mr. Perez's Nova. (R. 774 at 12:19-13:4; 774 at 249:1.) 
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The cars involved in this collision moved only short distances and made impact at 
low speeds. From his stationary position during the red light, Mr. Gray traveled a little 
over one car length before coming into contact with the Prunedas' LeBaron. (R. 775 at 
156:9-17.) In that time his vehicle only accelerated a small amount and made impact 
with the Prunedas' LeBaron while traveling at approximately nine to twelve miles per 
hour. (R. 774 at 133:12-15.) The Prunedas' LeBaron, on the other hand, only moved 
forward approximately one car length, eight to ten feet, before it made contact with Mr. 
Perez's Nova and it was only traveling approximately seven to nine miles per hour when 
it made impact with the Nova. (R. 774 at 133:18-20; R. 774 at 182:4-7; R. 774 at 191:3-
7.) The push from the Prunedas5 LeBaron caused the Nova toicoast[] off to the side of the 
road," before it came to a rest near the curb. (R. 774 at 249:1-3.) 
Not surprisingly, this low-impact collision resulted in little damage to each of the 
vehicles. The Dodge Durango driven by Mr. Gray showed little damage, only three small 
dents to the front bumper. (R. 774 at 179:12-14; R. 775: 161:6-9.) The LeBaron driven 
by Mr. Pruneda had damage to the rear bumper, trunk, fender and taillights, but the only 
damage to the front of the LeBaron was the grill. (R. 774 at 179: 6-22; R. 776.) The 
Nova driven by Mr. Perez only sustained minimal damage as a result of the impact and 
Mr. Perez had no physical injury. (R. 774 at 237:13-16; R. 774 at 130; R. 774 at 258:5-
259:9; R. 774 at 257:18-21) The repairs to Mr. Pruneda's LeBaron only amounted to 
$1,518.14. (R. 774 at 177:15.) 
The Prunedas' Medical Treatment 
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The Prunedas did not seek immediate medical attention for any potential injury 
related to the accident. (R. 774 at 25: 17-19.) Rather, a day or two after the accident Mr. 
Pruneda and his six children first sought treatment at Total Health Institute. (R. 774 at 
25: 17-25; R. 780-786.) Approximately ten days later they then went to a chiropractor, 
Dr. Gordon McLean. (R. 774 at 25: 15-17; R. 780-786.) On the intake forms at Dr. 
McLean's office, Mr. Pruneda listed his attorney as the person who had referred him to 
the McLean clinic. (R. 780 at PRUSER0025.) 
At Dr. McLean's, the Prunedas received a considerable amount of chiropractic 
treatment considering the low impact nature of the accident. Donavan, age 12, received 
42 visits in just nine months. (R. 781.) Anthony, age 10, made 40 visits in that same 
timeframe. (R. 782.) Sergio Jr., age 7 made 41 visits, and Cozy, age 8 made 45. (R. 
783-784.) Matthew and Zennia, ages four and two, made 31 and 30 visits respectively in 
a four month period between August and December 2002. (R. 785-786.) 
Experts at Trial 
The Prunedas designated their treating physician, Dr. Mclean, as an expert, and 
specifically indicated that he would give testimony as to ;*care and treatment." (R. 80-81; 
773 at 39:19-21, 773 at 51:4-5.) However, they gave no notice that they intended to elicit 
Dr. McLean's opinion on the issue of causation. (Id.) 
At trial, Dr. Jayne Clark gave expert testimony regarding the necessity and 
propriety of Dr. McLean's extensive treatment of the Prunedas. (R. 775 at 26-131.) 
While not a chiropractor, Dr. Clark is a physiatrist and expert in spinal injuries and care. 
(R. 775 at 27:11-17; 28:1.) 
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Also at trial, Dr. Paul France, an accident ^constructionist gave expert opinion 
regarding the sequence of events involved in the accident. (R. 774 at 169-246.) Dr. 
France reached his conclusions by performing calculations using physics equations 
involving kinematics of the vehicles, including speed, acceleration, distances, and 
momentum. (R. 187.) (Dr. France's Preliminary Investigation Report containing a 
description of the methodology used). This methodology for calculating vehicle 
kinematics is commonly used and accepted by accident reconstructionists. (R. 778 at 
66:18-25; R. 774 at 175:15-18; R. 774 at 119:18-23.) 
In this particular case, Dr. France formed his expert opinion after examining 
information contained in the following materials: impact studies involving similar 
vehicles, results of three-vehicle crash tests he personally performed, the traffic accident 
report prepared by the officer responding to the accident, vehicle repair estimates, 
photographs of the Prunedas' vehicle and Columbia Steel's vehicle after the accident, 
vehicle specifications from commercially available databases, and deposition testimony 
of Sergio Pruneda, Richard Gray of Columbia Steel, Elisha Archuleta and Victor Perez 
(whose vehicle was hit by the Prunedas after they were rear-ended by Richard Gray). (R. 
187; R. 774 at 176:12-25; R. 778 at 34:4-10.) Although there was damage to the 
Prunedas' vehicle not indicated in the repair estimates, Dr. France testified that the 
photographs he reviewed showed damage not indicated in the repair estimates, and, that 
he took into account the damage revealed in the photographs. (R. 778, at 24-25.) 
Additionally, Dr. France made clear that he was able to ascertain the damage to Mr. 
Perez's Nova, which was hit by the Prunedas vehicle, through the detailed description of 
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the damage provided by Mr. Perez in his deposition. (R. 778 at 24-25; R. 777 at 17-18.) 
Dr. France also explained that he was able to calculate the speed of the vehicles in this 
accident, at the time of impact, by running an "iterative equation" to determine the Delta 
V, which variable represents the car's change in speed. (R. 774 at 222:5-224:8.) In this 
process, Dr. France ran this iterative equation until he found a Delta V that matched with 
all the known damage to the vehicles and other known factual evidence about the 
collision. (R. 774 at 222:20-25.) Once Dr. France found a Delta V number that matched 
with the other known factual evidence, he was able to determine the impact speed of the 
vehicles. (R. 774 at 224:1-3.) 
The Jury Instruction 
At trial the Prunedas proposed and stipulated to a jury instruction that made it 
appear that the jury had the option of awarding general damages, even if special damages 
were awarded. (R. 577-599.) This jury instruction stated: 
If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
then it is your duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that you 
find, from a preponderance of the evidence, will fairly and adequately 
compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained. 
(R. 659) (emphasis added). The language from this instruction is repeated on the special 
verdict form filled out by the jury. (R. 701) ("If, and only if, the amount of special 
damages is $3,000 or more, then state the amount of general damages, if any, you 
award.") (emphasis added). The Prunedas' did not object to the special verdict form 
before it was given to the jury. (R. 775 at 217-218) (issuance of the special verdict form 
to the jury and no indication of objection from the Prunedas). 
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It was only after the jury returned a verdict that the Prunedas first objected to the 
jury instruction on damage and the special verdict form. (R. 775 at 284.) After making 
an objection, counsel for the Prunedas stated, "I've come instruction prepared." (R. 775 
at 284:17-18.) He then proceeded to present the court with a revised instruction on 
damages. {See id.) After objection from Columbia Steel and Richard Gray, the trial 
court judge repeatedly asked counsel for the Prunedas why he did not present this 
instruction prior to the jury's return of a verdict.1 The trial court then concluded that the 
Prunedas had waived their right to challenge the instructions or special verdict form by 
participating in the drafting of the instructions and stipulating the special verdict form. 
(R. 775 at 289:22-23.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point 1: The Prunedas Waived Their Right to Challenge Jury 
Instructions 
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of the Prunedas' request to submit 
revised jury instructions on the issue of damages where the Prunedas helped draft the 
very instructions they claim were erroneous and where the Prunedas only challenged the 
jury instructions after the jury had returned its special verdict. In Utah, it is well settled 
that a party is precluded from challenging a jury instruction that the party helped draft or 
otherwise approved. Where the Prunedas expressly approved the jury instruction they 
1
 (R. 775 at 284:19-20) ("Why didn't you prepare a verdict to suggest that?"); (R. 775 at 
286:4-6) ("Is there a reason why you didn't present an instruction, and why you didn't 
craft the verdict to reflect this need?"); (R. 775 at 286:16-19) ("My question is if you 
think this is an error and they should have been instructed, why did you not present an 
instruction? You never presented this instruction you're seeking."). 
9 
now claim was defective, they have waived their right to challenge the instruction at a 
later stage of the proceedings. 
Point 2: The Jury Instruction for General Damages Was Appropriate 
If this court does not find that waiver occurred, it should nonetheless affirm the 
trial court's decision because the jury instruction on damages was not improper. Where 
the Prunedas' complaints of pain and suffered were largely subjective and their 
credibility was questioned, it is proper for a jury to award special damages and decline to 
award general damages. Accordingly, a jury instruction that gave the option of awarding 
general damages was thus permissible. 
Point 3: The Prunedas' Treating Physician's Testimony On Causation 
Was Properly Excluded 
This court should also affirm the trial court's discretionary decision to exclude the 
Prunedas' treating physician's testimony regarding causation of the Prunedas' injuries. 
The trial court properly excluded such testimony because the Prunedas' failed to 
designate their treating physician as an expert who would testify on the issue of 
causation. Because the Prunedas only designated their treating physician to give 
testimony as to matters of ^care and treatment," Defendants Columbia Steel and Richard 
Gray did not have any notice of the causation testimony the Prunedas intended to elicit. 
As an additional ground for excluding the causation testimony, the Prunedas' treating 
physician failed to submit a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert report, which would have been 
required were he to testify as to matters of causation. Ultimately, however, exclusion of 
the testimony, if improper, amounted to mere harmless error because the jury ultimately 
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found that causation had occurred, even without the treating physician's expert testimony 
on causation. 
In light of the trial court's standing order, the trial court appropriately issued a 
curative instruction after causation testimony was elicited from the Prunedas' treating 
physician and redacted portions of the record that also constituted causation testimony 
from the treating physician. This was appropriate as counsel for Columbia Steel timely 
objected to the elicitation of the causation testimony and timely requested curative 
instructions and redaction. 
Point 4: Dr. France's Expert Accident Reconstruction Testimony Was 
Properly Admitted. 
This court should also affirm the trial court's discretionary decision to admit the 
expert testimony of Dr. Paul France, an accident reconstructionist. Where an expert's 
testimony is not based on novel scientific principles or techniques, a court properly 
admits the expert testimony where it is based on reports, writings, and observations of a 
type reasonably relied on by experts in the same field. In a prior case, this Court has 
specifically held that Dr. France's expert accident reconstruction testimony is not based 
on novel scientific principles and techniques. Thus, the trial court in this case correctly 
found that Dr. France's testimony was based on reports, writings, and observations of a 
type reasonably relied upon by other accident reconstructionists and properly admitted 
the testimony. 
Point 5: Dr. Clark's Expert Testimony Regarding Necessity and 
Propriety of the Medical Care the Prunedas Received Was 
Properly Admitted, 
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Finally, this court should affirm the trial court's decision to admit the expert 
testimony of Dr. Jayne Clark regarding the necessity and propriety of the medical care 
provided by the Prunedas' treating physician, a chiropractor, because Dr. Clark is 
knowledgeable about the amount of care needed to treat soft tissue spinal injuries. Utah 
law is clear that an expert in a different field than a treating physician may nonetheless 
comment on care provided by a treating physician where the expert is knowledgeable 
about the standard of care relevant to such injuries. As a specialist in spinal treatment, 
Dr. Clark was qualified to testify about a chiropractor's treatment of spinal injuries and 
the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting her testimony related to such. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE PRECLUDES THE PRUNEDAS 
FROM CHALLENGING THE ISSUE OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON 
APPEAL WHERE THEY DRAFTED AND APPROVED THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS THEY NOW CHALLENGE, THEREBY 
MISLEADING THE COURT AND INVITING ERROR. 
Pursuant to the invited error doctrine, the Prunedas waived their right to challenge 
the jury instruction regarding damages on appeal where they participated in the drafting 
of the original instruction and approved the same, thereby inviting the error of which they 
now complain. The invited error doctrine provides that "a jury instruction may not be 
assigned as error . . . 4 if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to 
the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction."' State v. Geukgeuzian, 
86 P.3d 742, 744 (Utah 2004). This is true even where a party's "failure to include 
[particular wording in the] proposed instruction was most likely inadvertent and not a 
conscious attempt to mislead the trial court.'' Id. at 745 
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The rationale behind the invited error doctrine is well established and sound. The 
Utah Supreme Court has made clear that "a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Id. at 
744 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993))). Thus the "invited error doctrine is crafted to 
discourage[] parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a 
hidden ground for reversal on appeal, [and] it is also intended to give the trial court the 
first opportunity to address the claim of error." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
Furthermore, this doctrine applies to invited errors in both civil and criminal cases. See 
Pratt v. Nelson, 127 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (applying the invited error 
doctrine to jury instructions used in a civil case). 
The invited error doctrine is consistent with the holdings of courts in other 
jurisdictions, which courts have examined the issue as it relates to jury instructions 
striking similar to those in this case. In Wright v. Jackson, a plaintiff injured in a car 
accident tendered jury instructions regarding damages allowed the jury to "fairly and 
reasonably compensation [plaintiff] for her mental anguish and physical suffering which 
she has endured and may in the future endure, by reason of any injury she may have 
received, if any . ..." 329 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959) (emphasis added). In 
addition to this instruction, the jury was told that "if they found for [the plaintiff], they 
could compensate her for medical expenses incurred, not to exceed the sum of $202." Id. 
The jury returned a verdict for $202, which although not specified as special damages, 
matched the amount allowed. Id. 
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In response to the plaintiffs objection to the lack of an award for general 
damages, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated, "[ojrdinarily, in a case such as the one 
we are now considering, the jury would be required to make some award for pain and 
suffering." Id. Notwithstanding this general rule, the court "held that any inconsistency 
in the verdict will not require a reversal where a plaintiff, as was done here, had offered 
an instruction which invited the error complained of afterwards." Id. The court then 
specifically noted that "the reiterated use of the phrase 'if any' appears after each item of 
damages in question" in the jury instructions for general damages tendered by the 
plaintiff. Id. at 561-62 (emphasis added). Thus, the court reasoned, "the jury was led to 
believe it had the right to grant or deny an award under each of these subjects." Id. at 
562. In conclusion the court cited the principle contained in the invited error doctrine, 
that "a party is estopped to take advantage of an error produced by his own act," and 
affirmed the award even though it did not allow for general pain and suffering. Id. 
In the present case, the Prunedas affirmatively represented to the court that they 
had no objection to a jury instruction regarding general damages that also included an ; if 
any" qualifying phrase, since the Prunedas themselves had proposed the instruction. (R. 
577-599.) This instruction stated: 
If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
then it is your duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that you 
find, from a preponderance of the evidence, will fairly and adequately 
compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained. 
2
 See also Grenz v. Kelsch, 436 N.W.2d 552, 554-55 (N. Dak. 1989) (noting that where a 
jury instruction stated that the jury could award ^reasonable compensation for pain . . . . 
suffered by the Plaintiff. . ., if any, . . . the jury was led to believe that it was entitled to 
grant or deny an award of damages."). 
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(R. 659) (emphasis added). Not only did the Pmnedas stipulate to this instruction, but the 
Prunedas actually proposed this instruction. (R. 577.) The language from this 
instruction is repeated on the special verdict form filled out by the jury. (R. 701) ("If, and 
only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the amount of 
general damages, if any, you award."). The Prunedas' did not object to the special 
verdict form before it was given to the jury, as evidenced by lack of any indication in the 
record to such. (R. 775 at 217-218) (issuance of the special verdict form to the jury and 
no indication of objection from the Prunedas). 
It was only after the jury returned a verdict that the Prunedas objected to the jury 
instruction on damage and the special verdict form. (R. 775 at 284.) Immediately upon 
objection, counsel for the Prunedas presented the court with a pre-made, revised 
instruction on damages. (R. 775 at 284:17-18) ("I've come instruction prepared."). In 
response to the Prunedas' objection and sudden presentation of revised instruction on 
damages, the trial court asked, "Why didn't you prepare a verdict to suggest that?" (R. 
775 at 284:19-20.) Then the court, speaking to the Prunedas' attorney, stated, "You've 
written this verdict, you've stipulated to it," (R. 775 at 284:24-25.) Upon further 
discussion, the court pressed counsel for the Prunedas for an explanation of this sudden 
objection by asking, "Is there a reason why you didn't present an instruction, and why 
you didn't craft the verdict to reflect this need?" (R. 775 at 286:4-6.) The trial court 
clarified its concern by again asking, "My question is if you think this is an error and they 
should have been instructed, why did you not present an instruction? You never 
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presented this instruction you're seeking." (R. 775 at 286:16-19.) In conclusion, the trial 
court stated to counsel for the Prunedas, "I think you've stipulated to this verdict form 
which waived that right." (R. 775 at 289:22-23.) 
Regardless of whether the Prunedas' failure to raise these issues regarding jury 
instructions on damages were inadvertent or a conscious attempt to preserve a hidden 
ground for appeal, their failure to do so constituted invited error. The jury instructions, 
which the Prunedas' proposed, and the special verdict form, to which the Prunedas' 
attorney stipulated, contained language that led the jury to believe that it had a right to 
deny general damages even if special damages were awarded. By using the phrase "if 
any" in connection with the award of general damages, it is understandable that juror 
would believe it had the option of making a general damage award. 
Having invited the very error they now seek to challenge, the Prunedas are 
precluded and have waived their right to challenge this issue by proposing and ultimately 
agreeing to the jury instructions and special verdict forms that contained the alleged error. 
II. IN THE EVENT THAT THE PRUNEDAS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR 
RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO RESUBMIT TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS THAT WOULD DIRECT AN AWARD OF 
"SUBSTANTIAL" GENERAL DAMAGES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS 
NOT ENTITLED TO GENERAL DAMAGES, OR EVEN NOMINAL 
DAMAGES, WHERE THE PRUNEDAS' COMPLAINTS OF PAIN AND 
SUFFERING WERE SUBJECTIVE AND HIS CREDIBILITY WAS 
QUESTIONED. 
The trial court did not err in refusing to resubmit a revised instruction to the jury 
directing the jury to award "substantial" general damages because of their award of 
special damages for Mr. Pruneda's medical expenses in an amount that exceeded the 
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personal injury protection threshold of $3,000. Although, "as a general rule, it is 
improper for jury to award special damages without awarding any general damages," 
Balderas v. Starks, 138 P.3d 75, 79 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), there are relevant exceptions to 
that general rule. One such exception arises "when the issue of general damages is 
contested . . . [and] the plaintiffs complaints are subjective and his or her credibility is 
questioned." 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages §43 (1988). 
A case illustrative of this general exception is Eisele v. Rood, 551 P.2d 441 (Or. 
1976). In Eisele, the plaintiff filed an action for personal injuries allegedly received in a 
rear-end accident at a stop light. Id. at 442. Although liability was not seriously 
controverted, "there was conflicting testimony as to whether plaintiff actually suffered a 
substantial injury and incurred any general damages." Id. More specifically, testimony 
put forward by the plaintiffs treating physician, a chiropractor, conflicted with testimony 
put forward by the independent medical examiner, a medical doctor retained by the 
defendants. Id. 
Ultimately the court in Eisele concluded that "under the pleadings and the 
evidence in a particular case, the jury could consistently find that the plaintiff suffered 
special damages but no general damages [and that] a verdict for special damages alone 
was proper." Id. at 443. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the record 
"disclose[d] that plaintiffs symptoms were primarily subjective." Id, at 442. Although 
plaintiffs chiropractor gave testimony of the plaintiffs injuries, the court astutely noted 
that "[t]he testimony of plaintiff s chiropractor was based primarily upon plaintiffs 
subjective complaints." Id. at 444. The court also noted that the "[p]laintiff s own 
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testimony is punctuated by periods of forgetfiilness and inconsistencies." Id. at 442. 
Additionally, other admissions by the plaintiff at trial brought his credibility into 
question. Id. (citing an admission that plaintiff had previously faked an injury). 
In light of the subjective nature of the injury and the issues of credibility, the court 
reasoned that "the jury could have rationally concluded that plaintiff was grossly 
exaggerating the extent of his injuries and that, on balance, the medical testimony did not 
demonstrate that plaintiff suffered any substantial injuries as a result of the accident." Id. 
And, at the same time "the jury could have also concluded that plaintiff did incur some 
reasonable expenses for diagnosis and treatment." Id. Under this reasoning, it an award 
consisting of only special damages is not improper. 
The reasoning used by the Eisele court is consistent with the case law in Utah, as 
nominal damages will suffice where general damages must be awarded, regardless of 
whether the special damages are above or below PIP threshold for medical expenses. 
First, it should be noted that nothing in Utah Code Section 31A-22-309 requires a 
"substantial^ award of general damages where a plaintiffs medical expenses exceed 
$3,000. Rather, the statute merely grants a person a right to maintain an action for 
general damages in the event that a person incurs medical expenses in excess of $3,000 
due to injuries received in an automobile accident. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
309(1). 
More generally, Utah courts have repeatedly affirmed awards of nominal general 
damages connected with a more substantial special damage award. In Tingey v. 
Christensen, a plaintiff was awarded $1,459.92 in special damages, an amount equal to 
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the plaintiffs emergency room expenses on the day of the accident, but only awarded 
$1.00 for general damages. 987 P.2d 588, 590 (Utah 1999). Upon appellate review, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated, "[tjhis is not an unusual award, especially in rear-end auto 
accidents with conflicting evidence on damages." Id. at 592. The court noted that w'the 
verdict [was] consistent with the evidence,5' and specifically cited the fact that the 
accident was minor and the speed of the cars at collision was 5 to 14 miles per hour. Id. 
Similarly, in Martineau v. Anderson, the court found no problems with a jury instruction 
which directed a jury "if they found special damages, . . . to find general damages, even 
though they (general damages) might be nominal." 636 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Utah 1981). 
On the other hand, none of the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Prunedas 
stand for, or even address, the proposition that nominal damages may not be awarded in 
conjunction with an award of special damages. In Shewry v. Heuer, 121 N.W.2d 529 
(Iowa 1963), the court did not hold that nominal damages were inappropriate where 
special damages were awarded. Instead, the court held that the jury could not fail to 
award anything in general damages when it awarded special damages for medical 
services. Id. at 532. It did not address the narrower issue of whether an award of 
nominal damage is appropriate in light of a more substantial award of special damages. 
Likewise, Kepley v. Kim, 843 P.2d 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), does not stand for 
the proposition that nominal damages are insufficient when an award of special damages 
in excess of $3,000 is award. As in Shewry, the jury awarded special damages and then 
failed to award any general damage, even a nominal amount. Id. at 137. Thus, the only 
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issue considered by the court was whether an award of special damages was consistent 
with a lack of award for general damages. Id. Nominal damages were not considered. 
Finally, even the Utah case cited by the Prunedas does not address the narrow 
issue of the propriety of a jury verdict that awards special damages, and only nominal 
general damages. In Foote v. Clark, the court only provided the definition of nominal 
damages, and the holding of the case was simply that u[a]llowing an award for nominal 
damages of more than merely a trivial sum, however small, would subvert the role of 
nominal damages as a means of acknowledging invaded rights without rewarding a 
successful party for nonexistent damages." 962 P.2d 52, 58 (Utah 1998). It is not 
surprising that the Prunedas cannot point to Utah precedent addressing this issue, as this 
Court stated last year that it is "unaware of any binding authority . . . addressing [the 
issue of] the propriety of a jury verdict that awards special damages, and only nominal 
damages." Balder as v. St arks, 138 P.3d 75, 79 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). Even if nominal 
damages were available to the Prunedas, remand would not be appropriate as Utah courts 
will not remand for a new trial where the only issue on remand is nominal damages. See 
Holmes Dew, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895, 906 (Utah 2002) ("[W]e generally do not 
remand if the damages are only nominal"). 
This court should affirm the Prunedas' award of special damages and no general 
damages as the Prunedas' case fits precisely into an acknowledged exception to the 
general rule that an award of general damages must accompany an award of special 
damages and where they would not necessarily be entitled to anything more than nominal 
damages. The Prunedas' complaints of injury were largely subjective and their treating 
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physician's testimony regarding their injury was based largely on these subjective 
complaints. Moreover, the testimony with respect to the injuries and amount of treatment 
needed was conflicting. See Section V, infra. And finally, nothing in Utah law requires a 
jury to award the Prunedas' anything more than nominal damages if the jury could not 
find evidence of general pain and suffering, even despite the medical expenses. Even if 
entitled to nominal damages, remand on this issue would be inappropriate as it violates a 
long established policy of refusing to remand for a new trial if the damages are only 
nominal. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
EXCLUDING THE PRUNEDAS5 TREATING PHYSICIAN'S 
TESTIMONY REGARDING CAUSATION BECAUSE THE 
PHYSICIAN WAS NOT DESIGNATED TO TESTIFY TO SUCH, THE 
PHYSICIAN FAILED TO PROVIDE AN EXPERT REPORT, AND THE 
EXCLUSION OF THE PHYSICIAN'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY DID 
NOT RESULT IN PREJUDICE OR OTHERWISE AFFECT THE 
JURY'S VERDICT, 
The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion by excluding the Prunedas' 
treating physician's testimony regarding causation of the Prunedas' injuries gi\en the 
Prunedas' failure to designate him to testify for such and the physician's failure to 
provide an expert report. A court has broad discretion in deciding to admit or bar 
testimony for failure to adhere to adhere to discovery obligations. See Huyot-Renoir v. 
Wilkinson, 2006 UT App 186 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (quoting State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 
1167, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[A] trial court's decision to admit or bar testimony for 
failure to adhere to discovery obligations lies within the trial court's discretion.'*). This is 
coupled with a trial court's similar discretion in ;%determin[ing] . . . who qualifies as an 
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expert witness and the admission of the witness's testimony." Haupt v. Heaps, 131 P.3d 
252 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
The Prunedas first ran afoul of their obligations in two respects. First, the 
Prunedas failed to give notice of their intent to elicit expert testimony from their treating 
physician beyond the two matters stated in their designation: "treatment and care." 
Secondly, even had notice been given, the Prunedas5 treating physician failed to provide 
a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert report, as would be required by a physician testifying to matters 
beyond treatment and care, such as matters of causation. Nevertheless, even if the court 
abused its discretion in limiting the Prunedas' treating physician's testimony to matters of 
treatment and in excluding his testimony as to causation, the error was harmless given 
that the jury nonetheless determined that the defendants had caused the Prunedas' 
injuries. 
As a result of the Prunedas' failure to meet these discovery obligations, it was not 
improper for the court to exclude the treating physician's causation testimony and 
subsequently give a curative instruction when the treating physician testified regarding 
causation in violation of the court exclusionary order, nor was it improper for the court to 
have redacted those portions of the treating physician's records that constituted opinion 
testimony as to causation. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Excluding the 
Prunedas' Treating Physician's Testimony Regarding Causation 
Because the Prunedas Only Designated Him to Testify as to "Care and 
Treatment" and Gave No Notice of Their Intent to Elicit Causation 
Testimony. 
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the Prunedas' treating 
physician's testimony regarding causation due to the Prunedas' failure to designate him 
as a causation witness. A trial court is not beyond the bounds of its discretion where it 
bars an expert witness from testifying due to a party's failure to make proper 
designations. DeBryv. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1360-61 (Utah 1994) 
(excluding expert witness testimony due to a party's failure to designate the expert within 
the relevant deadlines). This is particularly true where the designating party has "no 
surprise, no unforeseen circumstances, or any other legitimate excuse for their [failure to 
properly designate the witness]." Id. Excluding testimony not properly designated is 
proper to prevent the prejudice that would result due to a lack of notice, which notice 
"gives both parties the opportunity to prepare adequately for trial, including among other 
things, deposing witnesses, investigating witnesses' testimony and preparing an effective 
cross-examination." Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1994). Exclusion is a 
proper response even where defense counsel could have potentially anticipated the 
expert's testimony because "it is not defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all 
potential, yet undisclosed, expert [testimony]." State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1171 
(UtahCt.App. 1998). 
The Prunedas only designated their treating physician to testify as an expert on 
matters of ucare and treatment." (R. 80-81.) Counsel for the Prunedas conceded such in 
the hearing on Columbia Steel's motion to exclude the treating physician from testifying 
to matters of causation, stating WT just said that he was the treating physician and he was 
going to testify regarding his care and treatment/" (R. 773 at 39:19-21.) Nothing in the 
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designation gives any notice that the treating physician will go beyond matters relating to 
treatment and care, to issues of causation of the alleged injuries. (R. 773 at 51:4-5.) 
Given this lack of notice, the trial court was well within its discretion to exclude 
the Prunedas* treating physician's testimony with respect to causation while it admitted 
his testimony as to the matters for which he was designated: treatment and care. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Excluding the 
Prunedas' Treating Physician's Testimony Regarding Causation 
Because the Treating Physician Failed to provide a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) 
Expert Report 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the Prunedas' treating 
physician's testimony regarding causation because he failed to provide a Rule 
26(a)(3)(B) expert report, which report is required of a treating physician when he ;%steps 
into the shoes" of a retained expert by testifying to causation. Although this Court has 
held that a treating physician testifying only to "a factual description of his or her 
personal observations during treatment" need not be identified as an expert or provide an 
expert report, this Court likewise acknowledges that a 'treating physician who has 
formulated opinions going beyond what was necessary to provide appropriate care for the 
injured party steps into the shoes of a retained expert for purposes of [r]ule 26." Pete v. 
Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629, 634-35(Utah Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Thomas v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp,, 169 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (D. Mass. 1996)) (emphasis added). 
In making that acknowledgement, this Court drew from Thomas v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 169 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D. Mass. 1996), which case addresses precisely the issue of 
admitting a treating physician's testimony as to causation without an accompanying Rule 
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26 report. In Thomas, the District Court of Massachusetts held that a treating physician 
crosses the boundary between an expert who must merely be disclosed and an expert who 
must provide a report when the treating physician attempts to testify specifically on the 
topic of "causation and prognosis.v Thomas, 169 F.R.D. at 3. 
Subsequent to its holding in Thomas, the District Court of Massachusetts refined 
its holding and acknowledged that a treating physician may at times testify without the 
submission of a Rule 26 expert report, "even where their testimony relates to causation 
and prognosis." Garcia v. City of Springfield Police Dept., 230 F.R.D. 247, 248 (D. 
Mass. 2005). However, the court emphatically held that a treating physician's testimony, 
when unaccompanied by a report, must stay within certain boundaries to remain 
admissible. Id. at 249 (noting that '"none of the cases [cited by the plaintiff] stands for the 
proposition that testimony regarding causation and prognosis is always admissible absent 
an expert report so long as the witness is a treating care-provider"). The court declared 
that the boundary between admissible and inadmissible testimony of a treating physician 
is determined by "the foundation of the expert witness's opinion and the scope of the 
testimony." Id; see also Stone v. Deagle, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90430, 9 (D. Colo. 
2006) ("As a practical matter, the disclosure requirements under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) should 
not turn on the expert's label or classification^ but instead it] is the substance of the 
expert's testimony, not the status of the expert, which dictates whether a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) 
report will be required."). Thus, a treating physician's testimony crosses that boundary 
and becomes inadmissible where it extends beyond his or her "personal knowledge and 
observations obtained during the course of care and treatment" or in the event that the 
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treating physician "was . . . specially retained in connection with the litigation or for 
trial." Garcia, 230 F.R.D. at 249. 
In this case, the Prunedas' treating physician's opinion as to causation extends 
beyond facts made known to him during the course of his care and treatment of the 
Prunedas. In order to discuss the cause of the Prunedas' reported injuries, the Prunedas' 
treating physician, Dr. McLean, would have to go beyond what could be gleaned from a 
chiropractic consultation with and treatment of the Prunedas. Dr. McLean is not a 
biomechanical engineer, did not witness the subject accident, and did not have an 
understanding of the impact aside from unverified speed estimates given by Mr. Pruneda. 
(R. 780 at PRUSER0014.) While Dr. McLean may understand that car accidents can 
cause certain soft tissue injuries, he would have to go beyond his observations made 
during treatment of the Prunedas to determine the issue of causation. Thus, by attempting 
to offer causation testimony Dr. McLean was acting as a causation expert, and was 
required to submit a Rule 26 disclosure regarding his qualifications and opinions, which 
he did not do. 
Furthermore, it also appears that the Prunedas were referred to Dr. McLean by the 
very counsel that represented them at trial and now on appeal. The Prunedas listed 
Edward Wells, their current attorney, as their referral source on their intake forms at Dr. 
McLean's office. (R. 780 at PRUSER0025.) While not a formal retainer for purposes of 
litigation, it does suggest a special relationship between counsel and the treating 
physician which infers that the treating physician was retained for purposes of litigation. 
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C. Even if the Court Abused its Discretion by Excluding the Prunedas5 
Treating Physician's Causation Testimony, Exclusion was Harmless 
Error as the Jury Determined Causation Had Occurred Even Absent 
the Treating Physician's Testimony. 
Nevertheless, even if the trial court improperly excluded Dr. McLean's testimony 
regarding causation, the error was harmless as his testimony regarding causation was 
cumulative and the lack of his causation testimony did not affect the jury's verdict. 
Where a court's error is harmless, the decision of the trial court may be affirmed without 
remand. See Office of the Guardian ad Litem v. H.M. (State ex rel S.M.), 2007 UT 21, f^ 
62 (Utah 2007) (%i[T]he error was harmless . . . . We therefore affirm the decision of the 
[lower] court."). Thus, where expert testimony may be cumulative, erroneous exclusion 
will not justify remand. See id. (citing the cumulative nature of the excluded expert 
testimony as part of the reason the error of excluding such testimony was harmless). 
Additionally, where there is no convincing evidence that "excluding this testimony 
affected the jury's verdict... the error was harmless" and no remand is necessary. 
Green v Louder, 29 P.3d 638, 645-646 (Utah 2001). 
In this case, the jury's verdict made clear that the jury found that causation had in 
fact occurred. (R. 702.) The jury found for the Prunedas, which meant that the jury 
found that Richard Gray of Columbia Steel had caused damage to the Prunedas. Even if 
Dr. McLean had testified as to causation, his testimony would have been cumulative to 
the other evidence of causation, which evidence standing alone was sufficiently 
persuasive to the jury. 
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At most, the jury's verdict, which included an award of damages smaller than the 
amount the Prunedas' requested, demonstrated a reluctance about the amount of damage, 
not the fact of causation or even the fact of damage. Dr. McLean's testimony regarding 
causation would have had little, if any, effect on the jury's deliberation of the amount of 
damage. In fact, at trial Dr. McLean was permitted to testify to matters relating to the 
amount of damage. (R. 773 at 70:8-13, 83:19-97:3, 97:4-112:3, 113:18-121:13, 123:5-
128:9, 128:23-151:15, 151:15-159:13) (describing injuries reported by the Prunedas 
during the course of their treatment with Dr. McLean). Dr. McLean testified as to the 
type and amount of treatment he gave the Prunedas and he presented evidence to the jury 
as to the costs associated with those treatments, (id; see also R. 773:22-106:13) 
(describing treatment methods used on the Prunedas); (R. 773 at 82:9, 100:11, 112:3, 
121:1, 128:9, 151:5, 158:4) (listing the total cost of treatment given to Mr. Pruneda and 
his six children). 
Where Dr. McLean's causation testimony would not have affected the ultimate 
jury verdict, the exclusion of such testimony is harmless error. Given the other evidence 
and testimony respecting causation, Dr. McLean's causation testimony obviously was not 
needed for the jury to find in favor of the Prunedas. Dr. McLean's causation testimony 
also would not have been relevant to or influential on the area that the jury may have had 
reluctance, namely, the amount of general damages. Therefore, even if the trial court 
committed error, it was harmless at best and it is not necessary to remand for a new trial 
on the issue of damages. 
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D. In Light of the Court's Order, The Court Appropriately Issued a 
Curative Instruction After Causation Testimony was Elicited from the 
Treating Physician and Appropriately Redacted Portions of the 
Record that also Constituted Causation Testimony from the Treating 
Physician. 
The court properly granted Columbia Steel's request for a curative instruction 
where testimony was elicited from the Prunedas' treating physician that violated the 
court's standing order prohibiting the treating physician from testifying to matters of 
causation. Eliciting testimony in violation of a court's order, which excluded such 
testimony, is improper and could even render counsel in contempt of court. See State v. 
Clark, 124 P.3d 235, 238 (Utah 2005) (identifying six contemptuous acts, one of which 
was eliciting testimony in violation of a court order on a motion in limine). Where 
testimony subject to a court order is not necessarily elicited by counsel, but is voluntarily 
proffered by the witness himself, the testimony is still improper and may be remedied 
through a curative instruction. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998) 
(noting that a trial judge may issue a curative instruction which directs a jury to disregard 
either an improper question or "an improper answer a witness has given"). 
Counsel need not object the exact moment testimony subject to a court's 
exclusionary- order is elicited to properly receive a curative instruction regarding the 
prohibited testimony. In State v. Harmon, a witness proffered testimony regarding his 
invocation of his Miranda rights, which testimony ran afoul of a prior motion in limine 
excluding such testimony. 956 P.2d 262, 267 (Utah 1998). Counsel for the defense did 
not object at the exact moment the witness admitted to having invoked his Miranda 
rights, but instead waited for the witness to finish testifying. Id. Counsel explained that 
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"he had not objected during [the witness]5s testimony because he did not want to draw 
attention to [the improperly elicited evidence] and was not expecting the prosecutor to 
violate the court's pretrial order suppressing such evidence." Id. Upon being alerted of 
the improper testimony judge "offered to give a curative instruction to the jury." Id. 
Although counsel in that case ultimately declined the judge's offer, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that a curative instruction was a proper remedy where testimony is 
elicited in violation of a standing court order. The Utah Supreme Court stated that 
''curative instructions are a settled and necessary feature of our judicial process and one 
of the most important tools by which a court may remedy errors at trial." Id. at 271. 
Furthermore, "[t]here is rarely a case in which a trial judge is not called upon to affirm an 
attorney's objection and instruct the jury to disregard an improper question or an 
improper answer a witness has given." Id. The Utah Supreme Court then stated that "if a 
trial judge could not correct errors as they occur, few trials would be successfully 
concluded." Id. 
An objection to erroneous questions or answers given at trial is not untimely 
where it is made while the witness is still being examined. Even under the timeliness 
requirements of the ^contemporaneous objection" rule, a party's objection fails to be 
timely or specific enough to merit consideration on a appeal only where the party failed 
to raise the evidentiary challenge in a motion in limine, failed to adequately describe the 
evidence or the grounds for the challenge in a motion in limine, failed to make any 
objection whatsoever at trial, or only made an objection after a significant delay. See 
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986) (refusing to review an evidentiary 
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challenge because "[a]t no time did counsel offer specific objections on the grounds 
[raised on appeal]"); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1308 (Utah 1986) (refusing review 
of the evidentiary challenge because "defendant's motion in limine did not adequately 
describe the criminal act he was worried about [admitting into evidence]'5); State v. 
Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 301 (Utah 1988) (granting review of an evidentiary challenge to a 
statement made by one witness during trial, but not to a related statement made by a 
second person because the attorney only objected to the first witness's statement at trial); 
State v. John, 667 P.2d 32, 33-34 (Utah 1983) (considering an objection untimely). A 
significant delay is evident in extreme cases where "[t]he only objection before appeal 
was made a day after the testimony claimed to have been prejudicial was given, and after 
the prosecution had rested." John, 667 P.2d at 33-34 (emphasis added). 
Counsel for Columbia Steel timely objected to the elicitation of the Prunedas' 
treating physician's testimony regarding causation, which testimony had been excluded 
by a court ruling just minutes before the treating physician took the stand to testify. In its 
ruling, the court stated that the treating physician could testify as to the history provided 
to him by the Prunedas, including that they reported having been in an automobile 
accident. (R. 773 at 54.) However, the court's ruling prohibited the treating physician 
from giving opinion testimony as to the cause of the Prunedas' injuries. Id. 
In the first portion of his direct examination of the Prunedas' treating physician, 
counsel for the Prunedas asked whether the injuries identified by the treating physician 
"[a]re . . . things that the patient can cause by himself?" (R. 773 at 72.) While this 
bordered on objectionable, counsel for Columbia Steel admittedly made no objection. 
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(See id.) Shortly thereafter, and in response to a general question about the treating 
physician's treatment plan, the treating physician then voluntarily read from his records 
that "the patient has reached MMI for injuries related to the automobile accident" 
thereby suggesting that the accident caused the injuries. (R. 773 at 96) (emphasis added). 
When the treating physician again volunteered causation testimony in response to a 
question not specifically calling for causation testimony, Counsel for Columbia Steel 
timely objected. (R. 773 at 101.) In a side bar to the court, Counsel for Columbia Steel 
indicated that this voluntary testimony related to causation and thereby violated the 
court's order. (R. 773 at 101-102.) Counsel for the Prunedas offered to clarify the 
treating physician's testimony by asking follow-up questions that did not call for a 
causation assessment. (Id. at 102.) The treating physician volunteered testimony that 
suggested causation three additional times by stating that the Prunedas' injuries were 
"related to the automobile accident." (R, 773 at 111: 14, 124:9, 133:4-5.) Each time this 
testimony was in response to generic questions about the treating physician's assessment 
of the Prunedas' progress. (See id.) 
At this point, Counsel for Columbia Steel again objected to the testimony on the 
grounds that it violated the court's standing order and Columbia Steel asked the Court to 
instruct the jury to disregard the treating physician's statements as to causation. (R. 773 
at 133.) Counsel for Columbia Steel later explained to the court that the objectionable 
testimony was being volunteered by the witness, which made it difficult to object prior to 
the testimony actually being given. (R. 773 at 147, 133:11-12) (defense counsel 
explaining that the objectionable testimony was not due to plaintiffs' counsel's questions, 
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but the treating physician's answers). In short, the questions asked by counsel did not 
allow anticipation of the treating physician's voluntary causation testimony. {Id.) The 
court then determined that a curative instruction was appropriate and gave such to the 
jury, well before the treating physician's testimony had concluded. (R. 773 at 140-141, 
R. 773 at 142-243) (containing the remainder of the treating physician's testimony). 
The trial court concluded that, in order to be consistent with his ruling on the 
motion in limine, statements in the medical records that the accident was causally 
connected to the injuries must be redacted because those written statements also 
constituted the treating physician's opinion testimony as to causation. (R. 773 at 145:16-
20.) In the trial court's words, "if [the treating physician] thinks [the accident] is causally 
connected and he wrote in the record a causal statement, that still doesn't make it 
admissible, because I've already ruled that he can't backdoor this opinion just because he 
wrote it." (R. 773 at 137-138.) Statements as to treatment history, consistent with the 
court's ruling, were not redacted. 
In this case, Columbia Steel made timely objections to the treating physician's 
testimony proffered in violation of the trial court's standing order, as Columbia Steel's 
objections occurred while the treating physician was under direct examination. The 
timeframe in which Columbia Steel made its objections known is in stark contrast with 
those cases where the party either never voiced any objection or only objected a day after 
the objectionable testimony was elicited. It was permissible for Columbia Steel to object 
after the testimony was proffered as the questions that elicited the testimony were not in 
themselves objectionable, but only the answers that volunteered prohibited opinion 
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causation testimony. The court properly gave a curative instruction and properly 
redacted the treating physician's records to be consistent with the prior ruling. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
ADMITTING THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF DR. PAUL FRANCE 
BECAUSE HIS TESTIMONY WAS BASED ON REPORTS, 
WRITINGS, AND OBSERVATIONS OF A TYPE REASONABLY 
RELIED ON BY EXPERTS IN HIS FIELD. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert testimony of Dr. 
Paul France because such testimony was based on reports, writings, and observations of a 
type reasonably relied on by experts in the field of accident reconstruction. Trial courts 
are afforded "wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony," and 
an appellate court "will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
The trial court properly evaluated and admitted Dr. France's testimony under the 
standard set forth in State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 712 (Utah 1982) for experts using 
established scientific principles or techniques. There are essentially two standards for the 
admissibility of expert testimony in Utah courts and the nature of the expert's methods 
will determine which standard a court should apply. See Balderas v. Starks, 138 P.3d 75, 
82 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that expert testimony will be evaluated either under 
an inherent reliability test or a general acceptance standard depending on whether it is 
based on w*novel scientific principles or techniques.'*). The first standard, articulated in 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 338 (Utah 1989), uses a heightened "inherent reliability 
test" for expert testimony and applies only where there is a "plausible claim'' that the 
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testimony of a given expert is based on "novel scientific principles or techniques." Id.; 
see also Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638, 645 (Utah 2001). 
On the other hand, the second standard, outlined in State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 712 
(Utah 1982), applies to all other cases where an expert is not using novel scientific 
principles or techniques. Pursuant to the Clayton standard, a qualified expert "may base 
his opinions on reports, writings[,] or observations . . . so long as they are of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field." Id. at 726. Where expert 
testimony is admitted under Clayton, the opposing party "may challenge the suitability or 
reliability of such materials [relied upon by the expert] on cross-examination, but such 
challenge goes to the weight to be given the testimony, not to its admissibility." Clayton, 
646 P.2d at 726. 
As recently as last year, this Court made clear that the expert accident 
reconstruction testimony of Dr. France is not subject to the heightened inherent reliability-
test expressed in Rimmasch. In Balderas v. Starks,3 the court held that there was no 
"'plausible claim' that the testimony of Dr. France was based on novel scientific 
principles or techniques." 138 P.3d at 75, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). In fact, this Court 
stated that the argument that Dr. France's testimony was based on novel techniques "is 
essentially foreclosed by Green [v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638 (Utah 2001)], in which the Utah 
3
 It should be noted that the counsel for the Prunedas in this case and counsel for the 
Appellants in Balderas are the same. Since Balderas was published in May 2006, 
counsel for the Prunedas was undoubtedly aware, prior to filing the appeal brief in this 
case in January 2007, of this Court's strong statements with respect to their previously 
unpersuasive (and now recycled) arguments regarding Dr. France and the admissibility of 
his testimony under Rimmasch, 
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Supreme Court held that the testimony of an accident reconstructionist who, similar to 
Dr. France, employed a computer program to perform mathematical computations, was 
'certainly not based on novel scientific principles or techniques.'" Id. This Court then 
went on to explain that "Green underscores that for decades, accident ^constructionists 
employing techniques similar to those of Dr. France have been allowed to render expert 
opinions." Id In conclusion, this Court stated that a court must "evaluate Dr. France's 
testimony under the standard set forth in Clayton?' which is that an expert "witness may 
base his opinions on reports, writings[,] or observations not in evidence which were made 
or compiled by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
that particular field." Id, 
Under the standard set forth in Clayton, Dr. France's testimony is clearly 
admissible as it was drawn from materials reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. 
In reaching his conclusions regarding the Prunedas' accident, Dr. France relied upon the 
following: impact studies involving similar vehicles, results of three-vehicle crash tests 
he personally performed, the traffic accident report prepared by the officer responding to 
the accident, vehicle repair estimates, photographs of the Prunedas' vehicle and 
Columbia Steel's vehicle after the accident, vehicle specifications from commercially 
available databases, and deposition testimony of Sergio Pruneda, Richard Gray of 
Columbia Steel, Elisha Archuleta and Victor Perez (whose vehicle was hit by the 
Prunedas after they were rear-ended by Richard Gray). (R. 187; R. 778 at 34:4-10.) Dr. 
France testified that the photographs showed damage not indicated in the repair 
estimates, and, that he took into account the damage revealed in the photographs. (R. 778 
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at 24-25.) Additionally, Dr. France made clear that he was able to ascertain the damage 
to Mr. Perez's vehicle, which was in front of and hit by the Prunedas' vehicle, through 
the detailed description of such damage provided by Mr. Perez in his deposition. (See id.; 
see also R. 777 at 17-18.) After examining these materials, Dr. France reached his 
conclusions regarding the accident by performing calculations using physics equations 
involving kinematics of the vehicles, including speed, acceleration, distances, and 
momentum. (R. 187) (Dr. France's Preliminary Investigation Report containing a 
description of the methodology used). This methodology for calculating vehicle 
kinematics is commonly used and accepted by accident reconstructionists. (R. 778 at 
66:18-25.) 
In the absence of Utah law supporting their position, the Prunedas unpersuasively 
rely on Virginia case law, namely Tittsworth v. Robinson, 475 S.E.2d 261 (Va. 1996), to 
support their contention that Dr. France's accident reconstruction testimony should have 
been excluded. While touching on similar issues, Tittsworth is of no import in this case 
given that this Court has already considered and disregarded it. See Balderas, 138 P.3d at 
83 n.l 1. In deciding Balder as, this Court rejected Tittsworth, primarily because 
"Tittsworth applied the standard for admissibility of experts under Virginia law, which is 
different than that established by either State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, (Utah 1982), or 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)/' Id 
Ultimately, the Prunedas * challenge to Dr. France's testimony relates only to 
matters that affect the credibility, not the admissibility, of Dr. France's testimony as their 
challenge attacks the suitability and sufficiency of the materials Dr. France considered 
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while reconstructing the accident. In their challenge the Prunedas indicate that Dr. 
France lacked repair estimates for a third car in the accident, the Nova, that there was 
damage to their own car not described in their own repair estimates, and that Dr. France 
had to estimate the vehicles' Delta V (change in speed) in order to determine the impact 
speed and g forces involved in the accident. See Brief of Appellants' at 21-22. While 
challenges regarding such are appropriate for cross-examination of an expert accident 
reconstructionist, these challenges do not reveal any use of a novel scientific technique or 
principle, nor do they change the fact that the Dr. France based his opinions on materials 
reasonably relied on by other experts in the accident reconstruction field.4 
Given that Dr. France based his opinions on materials reasonably relied upon by 
accident reconstructionists, the trial court acted within its discretion by admitting Dr. 
France's expert testimony in this case. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
ADMITTING THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF DR. JAYNE CLARK, A 
4
 Also these challenges to Dr. France's testimony were sufficiently rebuffed by Dr. 
France himself. Dr. France explained that he was able to ascertain the damage to the 
Nova by reviewing the detailed description of the damage given by Mr. Perez, the car's 
owner, in Mr. Perez's deposition. (R. 777 at 17-18.) Likewise, Dr. France explained that 
he was able to take into account damage to the Prunedas' LeBaron that was not described 
in the repair estimate because that damage was evident in the photographs of the LeBaron 
that Dr. France reviewed. (R. 778 at 24-25.) Finally, while Dr. France acknowledged 
that he had to estimate the Delta V in order to determine the impact speed of the vehicles 
in the accident (and in turn the force with which they struck each other), he explained that 
he did not simply pick a number for the Delta V out of thin air. Instead, Dr. France ran 
"iterative equations5' that compared all the known factual evidence (including damage to 
the vehicles and barrier test data) to possible figures for Delta V. (R. 774 at 222:5-
224:8.) Through these equations Dr. France was able to determine which figure for Delta 
V most accurately matched with the known factual evidence about the accident, the 
vehicles, their damage, the distance they traveled, and barrier test data run on similar 
cars. (R. 774 at 222:20-25.) 
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PHYSIATRIST, REGARDING THE NECESSITY, PROPRIETY, AND 
EXTENT OF MEDICAL CARE PROVIDED BY A CHIROPRACTOR 
BECAUSE DR. CLARK IS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT CARE FOR 
SPINAL INJURIES. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert testimony of 
physiatrist, Dr. Clark to testify as to the necessity, propriety, and extent of the medical 
care provided to the Prunedas' by their chiropractor because Columbia Steel established 
that Dr. Clark is knowledgeable about the standard of care and treatment required for 
spinal problems. A practitioner of one school of medicine is not prohibited ;;as a matter 
of law . . . [from] testify [ing] against a member of another school." Burton v. 
Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985). Rather, all that Utah law requires for a trial 
court to admit such testimony is that the party offering the witness lay a sufficient 
foundation to "establish the witness' knowledge and familiarity with the standard of care 
and treatment commonly practiced by physicians engaged in [a given] specialty." Martin 
v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Greene v. Thomas, 662 P.2d 
491, 493 (Colo. App. 1982)). Thus, a member of one school of medicine may testify as 
to the treatment provided by a member of a different school when the "witness is 
knowledgeable about the standard of care of another specialty or when the standards of 
different specialties on the issue in a particular case are the same." Arnold v. Curtis, 846 
P.2dl307, 1310 (Utah 1993).5 
5
 Additionally, in Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 67 P.2d 654 (Utah 1937), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a trial court had correctly allowed the testimony of a medical doctor in a 
medical malpractice case against a chiropractor because the medical doctor was 
competent and qualified to testify as he was familiar with the standard of care applicable 
to the general practice of medicine in which the chiropractor had engaged. 
39 
The Prunedas erroneously contend that Columbia Steel did not lay a sufficient 
foundation to establish Dr. Clark's knowledge and familiarity with the type of care that 
would be considered reasonable given the injuries at issue in this case. The following 
facts controvert this contention. Prior to trial, Columbia Steel established that Dr. Clark 
is knowledgeable as a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, as well as being 
board certified as a disability analyst and in physical therapy. (R. 730 at 5:11-16; see 
also R. 129-135.) Dr. Clark also received fellowship training in spine care. See id. In 
fact, her medical practice "mostly deal[s] with the neurologic and musculoskeletal 
problems." (R. 730 at 7:3-4.) In her deposition, Dr. Clark testified that "the chiropractic 
fields overlap both . . . [her] therapy as well as physical medicine and rehabilitation" 
training and that she "practices all kinds of spine medicine and rehabilitation and 
therapies," which make her "feel confident to testify as to the standard of care for spine 
care problems, whether they're chiropractic or physical therapy, orthopedic or 
rehabilitative medicine." (R. 730 at 8:12-21.) 
Furthermore, Columbia Steel also established that Dr. Clark has specific 
knowledge regarding certain guidelines relevant to chiropractors. Dr. Clark testified that 
she was aware that the Utah Association of Chiropractic Physicians has adopted CAD 
protocols as guidelines that give some ranges of treatment that are extremely broad. (R. 
730 at 16:1-17:23.) Dr. Clark then explained that CAD protocols still remain a 
recommendation or guideline, rather than a uniformly imposed standard that all 
chiropractors must follow them. Id. Additionally, Dr. Clark testified that she knew that 
standards were set forth for chiropractors by the division of Occupational and 
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Professional Licensing. (R. 730 at 14:18-21, 15:1-17, 10:14-17, 16:17-20.)6 On their 
part, the Prunedas did not present any evidence that CAD protocols are the standard of 
care for chiropractic treatment in Utah, that CAD guidelines were the standard of care for 
treatment of neck and back injuries, or that CAD protocols justified the voluminous 
number of treatments that their chiropractor gave them. 
The trial court properly determined that Columbia Steel laid a sufficient 
foundation to establish Dr. Clark's knowledge regarding the reasonableness of care for 
the Prunedas' alleged soft tissue neck and back injuries, regardless of whether that care 
was provided by a chiropractor, a medical doctor, or a D.O. Dr. Clark is trained in spinal 
medicine and rehabilitation and she practices all kinds of spine rehabilitation therapies. 
This training and professional practice demonstrated Dr. Clark's knowledge of the 
amount of care necessary for rehabilitation of soft tissue injuries, such as those alleged in 
this case. More specifically, this demonstrates her ability to judge when treatment for 
such injuries is needed and when it is excessive. Since Dr. Clark was not called on to 
testify as to any matters of chiropractor malpractice, but rather the extent and necessity of 
soft tissue spine treatment offered, her knowledge more than qualified her. As a result, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting her testimony as to the extent, 
6
 Additionally, the Prunedas' criticism that Dr. Clark did not independently examine them 
is disingenuous. Dr. Clark explained that the Prunedas were asked to come in for an IME 
with her, but were reluctant to do so. (R. 730 at 22:4-17: R. 775 at 33:13-34:4.) 
Subsequent to her request that Mr. Pruneda return to Utah for an IME, Mr. Pruneda 
reported that he had no ongoing problems or pain and did not want to ha\e to return to 
Utah from California. (R. 730 at 22:19-23:2.) The Pruneda children had already been 
defined by their chiropractor as having reached maximum medical improvement and 
lacking symptoms, so the attorney's agreed there was no reason to see them. (Id.) 
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propriety, and necessity of the treatment given by the Prunedas' chiropractor for the 
Prunedas' spine related injuries. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the trial court's judgment. Utah law clearly precludes the 
Prunedas from challenging a jury instruction that they themselves proposed or special 
verdict form to which they stipulated. Furthermore, the jury7 instruction as proposed was 
proper as a jury need not award general damages to a party injured in a car accident, even 
where the injured party's medical expenses exceed a personal injury protection threshold, 
where the jury finds the complaints of damage to be subjective or the credibility of the 
injured party questionable. Finally, the trial court acted well within its discretion by 
admitting the expert testimony of Dr. France and Dr. Clark and by excluding the 
testimony of Dr. McLean, the Prunedas' treating physician, on the issue of causation. 
Respectfully submitted this 28™ day of March, 2007. 
By: 
STRONG & H 
*/ 
lobert L. Janicki 
Peter H. Christensen 
Heather Waite-Grover 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of BRIEF OF 
delivered on the 28™ day of March, 2007, to the following: 
Mel S. Martin, Esq. 
Edward T. Wells, Esq. 
MEL S. MARTIN, P.C. 
5282 So. Commerce Drive, # D-292 
Murray, UT 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Proposed Jury Instruction on Damages 
2. Jury Instruction on Damages 
3. Trial Court's Oral Decision on the Prunedas' Request to Submit a Revised 
Instruction on Damages to the Jury 
4. Trial Court's Oral Decision on Columbia Steel's Motion in Limine to Exclude the 
Prunedas' Treating Physician, Dr. McLean, 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Edward T. Wells (Bar No. 3422) 
Matthew G. Cooper (Bar No. 5268) 
5282 South Commerce Drive, #D-292 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)284-7278 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
SERGIO PRUNEDA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COLUMBIA STEEL CASTING CO., 
INC., an Oregon corporation, and 
RICHARD D. GRAY, 
Defendants. 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Civil No. 030402552 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Comes now plaintiff and requests the court to give to the jury in the above case the attached 
instructions numbered 1 through 25, in addition to any stock instructions the court may have 
provided to counsel. 
Dated this 24th day of March, 2006 /?/I 
Edward T.Wells 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of March, 2006,1 caused to be mailed 
by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS to 
Steven T. Densley 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
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INSTRUCTION NO. / 
The evidence in the case will consist of the sworn testimony of the witnesses, 
regardless of who may have called them; all exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may 
have introduced them; and all facts which may have been judicially noticed, and which I instmct 
you to take as true for the purposes of this case. 
Depositions may also be received in evidence. Depositions contain swom 
testimony, with the lawyer for each party being entitled to ask questions. Testimony provided in 
a deposition may be read to you in open court or may be seen on a video monitor. Deposition 
testimony is to be considered by you, subject to the same instructions which apply to witnesses 
testifying in open court. 
Statements and arguments of lawyers are not evidence in the case, unless made as 
an admission or stipulation of fact. When the lawyers on both sides stipulate or agree to the 
existence of a fact, you must, unless otherwise instructed, accept the stipulation as evidence, and 
regard that fact as proved. 
I may take judicial notice of certain facts. When I declare that 1 will take judicial 
notice of some fact, you must accept that fact as true. 
Any evidence as to which I sustain an objection, and any evidence I order to be 
stricken, must be entirely disregarded. 
x j^iything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence, and 
must be entirely disregarded. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2 — 
After the evidence has been heard and arguments and instructions are concluded, 
you will retire to consider the evidence and arrive at your verdict. You will determine the facts 
from all the testimony you hear and the other evidence that is received. You are the sole judges 
of the facts. Neither I nor anyone else may invade your responsibility to act as judges of the 
facts. 
On the other hand, and with equal emphasis, I instruct you that >ou are bound to 
accept the rules of law that I give you whether you agree with them or not. 
References: 
JEFUNo. 1.1 (1957) 
Fed. Jury Prac. & Instructions § 70.06 (1987). Reprinted with permission; 
copyright © 1987 West Publishing Company 
MUJI1.5 
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INSTRUCTION NO.J) 
This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard from the 
witnesses, and have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other tangible things admitted 
into evidence. 
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be 
considered by you in arriving at your verdict. 
You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made during 
trial. 
References'. 
JEFU No. 3.6(1957) 
MUJI2.4 
5 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
—1 
Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is very important. It 
will not be productive for any of you, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic 
expression of your opinion on the case, or to announce a determination to stand for a certain 
verdict. When that happens, your sense of pride may be aroused and you may hesitate to recede 
from an announced position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans 
or advocates in this matter, but are judges. Your deliberations in the jury room are for the 
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the administration of justice. 
References: 
JIFUNo. 1.8(1957) 
MUJI2.7 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of 
the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a 
right to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of 
motive to testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the 
reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their 
opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should 
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the 
witnesses' statements. 
References'. 
JIFU No. 3.2(1957) 
MUJI2.9 
7 
INSTRUCTION NO. _L 
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made statements 
inconsistent with that witness' testimony given here in this case. 
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to entirely disregard the 
present testimony. The effect of such evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for you to 
determine. 
References'. 
JIFUNos. 3.10, 3.11 (1957) 
MUJI2.10 
8 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3=-
In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by way of deposition. 
You are not to discount this testimony for the sole reason that it comes to you in the form of a 
deposition. It is entitled to the same consideration as if the witness had personally appeared. 
References: 
JIFU No. 3.3(1957) 
MUJI2.12 
9 
INSTRUCTION NO. V) 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be 
received as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses 
who, by education, study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or 
calling, may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert, 
so long as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the 
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think it 
deserves. If you should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon 
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support 
of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may 
disregard the opinion entirely. 
References: 
JIFU No. 3.7(1957) 
Fed. Jury Prac. & Instructions § 72.08 (1987 & Supp. 1991). Reprinted with permission; 
copyright © 1987 West Publishing Company 
MUJI2.14 
10 
INSTRUCTION NO. Y 
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden of proof rests upon a 
certain pany, or that a party must prove a certain proposition, or that you must find a certain 
proposition to be true, I mean that unless the truth of the allegation is proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence, you shall find that the same is not true. 
References' 
JIFUNo. 2.1 (1957) 
MUJI2.16 
11 
INSTRUCTION NO. jQ 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, in your 
minds, seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and satisfactory. The 
preponderance of the evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of 
the testimony, but by the convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and 
honestly by you. If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, 
you must find that such allegation has not been proved. 
References'. 
JFUNo.3.1 (1957) 
MUJI2.18 
12 
INSTRUCTION NO. )f 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view 
to reaching an agreement, if your individual judgment allows such agreement. You each must 
decide the case for yourself, but only after consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You 
should not hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is wrong. However, you should 
not surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors. 
References'. 
JDFUNo. 1.7(1957) 
MUJI2.25 
13 
INSTRUCTION NO. \2*~-
It is your duty to make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit to you. In 
making your findings of fact, you should bear in mind that the burden of proving any disputed 
fact rests upon the party claiming the fact to be true, and that fact must be proved by [a 
preponderance of the evidence] [clear and convincing evidence]. 
This is a civil action and six members of the jury may find and return a verdict. At 
least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the same six on 
each question. As soon as six or more of you ha\e agreed on the answer to each question, have 
the verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then return it to this room. 
References'. 
JDFUNo. 1.10(1957) 
MUJI2.27 
14 
INSTRUCTION NO. j j 
Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of you to act as foreperson, who 
will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. The foreperson 
should not dominate the jury, but the foreperson's opinion should be given the same weight as the 
opinions of the other members of the jury. 
References'. 
JIFUNo. 1.9(1957) 
MUJI2.28 
15 
INSTRUCTION NO. j^f 
In this case the plaintiffs claim the defendant was negligent in one or more of the 
following respects: 
A. Defendant failed to keep a proper lookout and while driving on a 
public highway and collided with the vehicle of plaintiff who was lawfully stopped to avoid 
colliding with a vehicle in front of him. 
B. Defendant failed to keep his vehicle under proper control while 
driving on a public highway and collided with the vehicle of plaintiff who was lawfully stopped 
to avoid colliding with a vehicle in front of him. 
B. Defendant drove his vehicle into the vehicle occupied by the 
plaintiff who was lawfully stopped to avoid colliding with a vehicle in front of him. 
To return a verdict for the plaintiffs, you must find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that: 
1. The defendant was negligent in one or more of the particulars 
alleged by the plaintiff; and 
2. The defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' 
injuries. 
If you find in favor of the plaintiffs on any one of the three questions, you must 
then decide the amount of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
References: 
JTFU No. 2.4(1957) 
MUJI3.1(Modified) 
16 
INSTRUCTION NO. lb 
A person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other people or 
property. "Negligence" simply means the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care does 
not require extraordinary caution or exceptional skill. Reasonable care is what an ordinary, 
prudent person uses in similar situations. 
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the situation. You 
must decide what a prudent person with similar knowledge would do in a similar situation. 
Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act. 
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent conduct 
may recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or damages. 
References: 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) 
Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981) 
Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 23 Utah 2d 252, 461 P.2d 466 (1969) 
Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964) 
JIFUNos. 15.1,15.2, 15.3,15.4(1957) 
BAJINos. 3.00(1986), 3.10 (1986), 3.11 (Supp. 1992), 3.12 (Supp. 1992). 
Reprinted with permission; copyright © 1986 West Publishing Company 
MUJI3.2 
17 
INSTRUCTION NO. ( f0 
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, produces the injur/' and without which the injury would not have occurred. A 
proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. 
References: 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985) 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) 
Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 P.2d 1177 (1971) 
Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966) 
JIFUNo. 15.6(1957) 
BAJI No. 3.75 (1986). Reprinted with permission; copyright © 1986 West Publishing Company 
MUJI3.13 
18 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 7 
The driver of any vehicle has the duty to exercise reasonable care at all times to 
avoid placing others in danger. 
References; 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) 
BAJI No. 5.00 (1986). Reprinted with permission; copyright © 1986 West Pubhshing Company 
MUJI5.1 
19 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
The driver of any vehicle has the duty to use reasonable care to avoid danger. 
In that regard, every driver is required: 
1. To keep a lookout for other vehicles and highway conditions that 
reasonably may be anticipated. 
2. To keep the vehicle under proper control. 
3. To follow another vehicle at a safe distance, with proper regard for 
both vehicles' speed, other traffic, and highway conditions. 
4. To control his vehicle so as to avoid colliding with other vehicles upon 
the roadway. 
References: 
MUJI5.4 
Jorgensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 19S7; 
£ 
INSTRUCTION NO. j ? 
The law provides that any person driving a motor vehicle on a public roadway 
shall keep a proper lookout. A "proper lookout" means maintaining the lookout that an ordinarily 
careflil person would use in light of all conditions existing at the time and those reasonably to be 
anticipated. 
A "proper lookout" includes a duty to see objects and conditions in plain sight, to 
see that which is open and apparent and to realize obvious dangers. This duty does not merely 
require looking, but also requires observing and understanding other traffic and the general 
situation. 
References: 
Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah 1983) 
Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975) 
Wardell v. Jerman, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P.2d 485 (1967) 
MUJI5.14(modified) 
21 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~2& 
It is the duty of every person using in a public roadway, whether as a pedestrian or 
as a driver of a vehicle, to exercise reasonable care at all times to avoid placing oneself or others 
in danger, and to use reasonable care to avoid causing; an accident. 
References: 
Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 (1954) 
Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d495 (1949) 
JIFUNo. 20.1 (1957) 
BAJI No. 5.50 (Supp. 1992). Reprinted with permission; copyright © 1986 West Publishing 
Company 
MUJI 5.21 (modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2-
If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, then it is 
your duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that you find, from a preponderance of the 
evidence, will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained. 
References: 
JIFUNo. 90.1 (1957) 
MUJI27.1 
23 
ADDENDUM 2 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
JURY INSTRUCTION # 1 
OPENING INTRODUCTION - NATURE OF CASE, GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Members of the jury, we are about to begin the trial of this case. You have heard some 
details about this case during the process of jury selection. Before the trial begins, however, there 
are certain instructions you should have to better understand what will be presented to you and how 
you should conduct yourself during the trial. 
The parties who bring a lawsuit are called the plaintiffs. In this action the plaintiffs are 
Sergio Pruneda, Iris Pruneda, Anthony Guerrero, Donovan Guerrero, Sergio Pruneda, Jr., Cozy 
Pruneda, Matthew Pruneda, and Zennia Pruneda. The parties against whom the suit is brought are 
called the defendants. In this action the defendants are Columbia Steel Casting Company, Inc., and 
Richard D. Gray. 
The plaintiffs seek recovery for general, compensatory, and special damages arising from an 
automobile accident. The defendants deny the plaintiffs7 claims. 
By your verdict, you will decide disputed issues of fact. I will decide all questions of law that 
arise during the trial. Before you retire to deliberate at the close of the case, I will instruct you on 
the law that you must follow and apply in deciding your verdict. 
Since you will be called upon to decide the facts of this case, you should give careful 
attention to the testimony and evidence presented for your consideration, bearing in mind that I will 
instruct you at the end of the trial concerning the manner in which you should determine the 
credibility or "believability" of each witness and the weight to be given the testimony. During the 
INSTRUCTION NO 3 7 
If you find the issues m favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, then it is your 
duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that you find, from a preponderance of the 
evidence, will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 8 
In awarding such damages, you may consider any pain, discomfort, and suffering, both 
mental and physical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to which the plaintiff has 
been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as previously enjoyed. You may also 
consider whether any of the above will, with reasonable certainty, continue in the future. If so, 
you may award such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for them. 
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law to fix reasonable 
compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount 
of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel as to the amount of 
damages is not evidence of reasonable compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, 
you shall exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the damages you fix 
shall be just and reasonable in light of the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION # ^ 
You are instructed that the laws of the state of Utah provide that there can be no award of 
general damages unless there is an award of medical expenses exceeding S3 000 andyor a finding of 
permanent disability or permanent impairment. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^O 
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable value of medical care, 
services and supplies reasonably required and actually given in the treatment of the plaintiffs and 
the reasonable value of similar items that more probably than not will be required and given m 
the future. 
INSTRUCTION NO. H\ 
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable value of working time lost to 
date. In determining this amount, you should consider (1) evidence of the plaintiffs earning 
capacity; (2) earnings; (3) how the plaintiff ordinarily was occupied; and (4) what the plaintiff 
was reasonably likely to have earned in the time lost if the plaintiff had not been injured. 
INSTRUCTION # 4 2 
It is the duty of a person who has been injured to use reasonable diligence m caring for the 
injuries and reasonable means to prevent their aggravation and to accomplish healing 
When an injured person does not use reasonable diligence to care for the injuries, and they 
are aggravated as a result of such failure, the liability, if any, of another whose act or omission was 
a proximate cause of the original injury must be limited to the amount of damage that would have 
been suffered if the injured person had exercised the required diligence 
INSTRUCTION # ^ 
The fact that I have instructed you concerning damages is not to be taken as an indication that 
I either believe or do not believe that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such damages. The 
instructions in reference to damages are given as a guide in case you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. However, if you determine that there should 
be no recovery, then you will entirely disregard the instructions given you upon the matter of 
damages. 
ADDENDUM 3 
1 MS. ATWOOD: Yes, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Was that your verdict, 
3 Mr. Bunnell? 
4 MR. BUNNELL: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: And was that your verdict, 
6 Ms. Willmore ? 
7 MS. WILLMORE: Yes, sir. 
8 MR. WELLS: Your Honor, we have one problem. 
9 that we need to address. 
10 THE COURT: Yes. Could you approach? 
11 MR. WELLS: Having awarded the special 
12 damages, they can't award a zero. There's case law on 
13 that --
14 MR. CHRISTENSEM: They can't award what? 
15 MR. WELLS: They cannot award general damages 
16 of zero. They have to award general damages and it has 
17 to be more than a nominal amount. I've come instruction 
18 prepared. You'll have to send them back out. 
19 THE COURT: Why didn't you prepare a verdict 
20 to suggest that? 
21 MR. WELLS: Because it never — 
22 MR. CHRISTENSEN: They don't have to 
23 (inaudible ) . 
24 THE COURT: You've written this verdict, 
25 you've stipulated to it. I'd have to reprint this 
1 verdict . 
2 MR. WELLS: No. The verdict: is what it is. 
3 Ii has a provision for general damages, and they have to 
4 award some. 
5 MR. CKRISTENSEN: They have io (inaudible). 
6 MR. WELLS: Case law. 
7 THE COURT: I'll hear an argument for a few 
8 minutes. I'll excuse them and I'll hear this argument. 
9 MR. WELLS: Okay. 
10 THE COURT: Counsel wish to address an 
11 argument that may affect the verdict; . I apologize for 
12 any further delay. I'll ask if you'll be patient with 
13 us for a few moments longer. May I excuse you to the 
14 jury room. It shouldn't take long. 
15 BAILIFF: All rise for the jury. 
16 THE COURT: Just give me a moment, please. 
17 Please be seated. Your argument, Mr. Wells 
18 that concerned our bench conference, I assume applied to 
19 Sergio? 
20 MR. WELLS: It applies to Sergio. 
21 THE COURT: And Sergio only? 
22 MR. WELLS: He's the only one with damages 
23 over tnreshold. 
24 THE COURT: And you claim they have to award 
25 some general damages. 
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MR. WELLS: They have to award general damages 
and it has to oe an amount that's more than a nominal 
amount. I have an instruction that I would --
THE COURT: Is there a reason why you didn't 
present an instruction, and why you didn't craft the 
verdict to reflect tnis need? 
MR. WELLS: Because the verdict is what it is. 
It tells them to award general damages. 
THE COURT: Why are you asking for an 
instruction, then? 
MR. WELLS: Well, because they have made an 
error. 
THE COURT: How would they know? 
MR. WELLS: Because the Court's going to tell 
them . 
THE COURT: No. My question is if you think 
this is an error and they should have been instructed, 
why did you not present an instruction? You never 
presented this instruction you1re seeking. 
MR. WELLS: They are instructed. They're 
instructed that if -- that they're to award general 
lamag; 
THE COURT: What is the instruction that vc1 
r
 P n ""• P s P n t P ' seek that you could not hav< 
I don't understand wny you didn't present i: 
MR. WEJJLS : Because in doesn't become an issue 
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until they award special damages over the threshold and 
then do not award general damages. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Can I address this, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Well, I believe I've read a case 
on this, and it could be something even as much as a 
dollar. Isn't it -- isn't that the authority on it? 
MR. WELLS: I think they have to award more 
than nominal damages. 
THE COURT: I don't recall that one. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's completely wrong, 
Your Honor. First off, I think if counsel wanted them 
instructed on that, there should have been a jury 
instruction. And secondly, he shouldn't have stipulated 
to the questions 6A and 63 the way -- excuse me, 6B 
and -- 6A and 6B the way ir reads, which gives them the 
option if they award more than $3,0G0 to put nothing 
down for general damages. If something had to be 
awarded if it was over $3,COO, he could have very easily 
crafted the question and tell them that. 
And secondly, I know if it's going to be a 
general damage, they can award as little as a dollar 
because I have had specific questions come out from 
jurors saying, Can we give them, you know, a cc ;= - 9 
And the response has been, You can only give them a 
2 dollar in general damages if you give them specials. 
3 I You can': gee ro generals unless you have some specials. 
And so the long and short of it is this jury 
is going to be instructed that they have to give an 
6 I amount, which I donTt think they should be instructed. 
7 ] He had his opportunity to instruct them, but if the 
8 1 Court is so inclined to give that instruction, then that 
9 I instruction has to include that they can give as little 
10 i as a dollar. 
11 THE COURT: I believe that's fair. 
12| MR. WEILS: (Inaudible.) 
13 | THE COURT: My biggest concern is waiver. 
14 MR. WELLS: Well, I think -- I can't cite Your 
15 Honor to the case right now, but I think there's a case 
16 that says they have to award generals if they award 
17 specials. And there is case law, not from this 
18 jurisdiction, from other jurisdictions, where they have 
19 a statutory minimum such as the $3,000 we have here that 
20 say, in effect -- I think m effect what they're saying 
21 is, we have a threshold to make a determination between 
22 not serious cases and serious cases. Nominal damages 
23 are appropriate only in cases where they find liability 
24 but no damage, that's when nominal damages are 
approoriate >0 c: ^  ^ c; o T- ^  p +-
we're over the threshold and then award nominally. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, to say -- to 
come here in front of the Court at this point and say I 
think there's a case and to say I think the real 
authority is outside the state is insufficient. If he 
thought this was going to be a problem, he should have 
come with the authority and informed the Court of that 
beforehand and not stipulated to this jury instruction. 
His conduct in stipulating to this special 
verdict led us to where we are at right now, and I am 
not aware of any case authority that says they cannot 
just give specials. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to stipulate to an 
instruction and to have the jury directed as to question 
63? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, I don't. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: I can't do it. I'll tell you, 
Mr. Wells, I believe I read such a case about the award 
of general damages following specials, but I think your 
THE COURT: You stioulated to this verdict 
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norm. 
MR. WELLS: And I think the form is entirely 
correcc, and I think when the jury comes in and awards 
special damages of zero, than thatTs an error and the 
Court should send them out again, but I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Well, in my opinion, the language 
that includes "if any you award," encompasses the award 
of zero, and that's my interpretation. 
Z fT er you preserve the record as 
Mr. Christensen has suggested and presented authority 
(inaudible). 
Please escort the jury. 
BAILIFF: All rise for the jury. 
THE COURT: Please be seated. Thank you, 
ladies and gentlemen, for your continued patience. We 
have no further business to conduct. We are -- we can 
conclude now. And I wish to, again, thank you for your 
service. I know it's been a taxing business but you 
have been attentive and you are to be commended. We 
appreciate your service. We hope you have a pleasant 
evening. Ycu are excused at this time and you are at 
talk to whomever you wish about this case, if 
cr.ocse ^ - o Quite frankly, the lawyers may wish to 
z: 
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MR. WELLS: i understand. 
THE COURT: —possibilities, I guess. All 
right. Thau covers your morion? 
MR. WELLS: Yes. The second— 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, may I just have a 
clarification? So what is your— 
THE COURT: Last night's matter doesn't seem to 
pertain to this business. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Correct. Thau's fine. I 
will stipulate— 
THE COURT: It's excluded uncer 403, unless 
your testimony—examination would suggest something 
else, whereupon you will notify me. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Correct. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. WELLS: Secondly, Your Honor, I'd like a 
little bit of a clarification. We talked about his 
motion in limine yesterday regarding Dr. McClean as an 
expert witness. That--as I told you yesterday, that 
motion came at a late time and I really haven't had time 
to sit and think about it and to look at it. 
I did pull the comments that I read to the 
Court yesterday. But in looking au it again briefly 
last night, it doesn't appear to me than the cases ciued 
bv the defense have anvthina to do with the narrow issue 
nzi^^T; 
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MR. W^LLS: He is "che treating doctor and he is 
going to give opinions— 
THE COURT: Okay, what— 
MR. WELLS: —under seven— 
THE COURT: But you didn't notice them about 
that opinion. 
MR. WELLS: And that—no. But what I'm saying 
to Your Honor is I don't have to tell them what opinions 
he is going to give unless he is especially retained 
under B. And that's what that comment— 
THE COURT: But you gave them the notice. You 
gave them the notice as to trie opinion. 
MR. WELLS: No, I didn't. 
THE COURT: I read it. 
MR. WELLS: I said he's going to give— 
THE COURT: Give me your document. 
MR. WELLS: Where are the— 
THE COURT: Okay. The document that I'm 
reading from is the expert witness disclosure by 
Mr. Wells dated July 12th m wnich it says— 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Just a moment. Let me get my 
copy here. 
THE COURT: You can look at the Court's. 
"Plaintiff herebv designates the fcllowma oerscns who 
are expected to giv sessional opinion testimony at 
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So you've got the wide group, anybody thatTs 
going to give opinion has to be identified as someone 
who will give opinions. Then within that you have a 
subgroup and it says anyone who is specially retained 
for the litigation, solely for the purpose of giving 
opinions for that litigation, has no give a report. 
Now, that's what this comment is all about. 
And the comment says the requirement of a written 
report, in subparagraph (2)(B)—and in the Utah rules it 
would be (3) (3)—applies only to those experts who are 
retained or specially employed to provide such testimony 
in the case or whose duties as an employee of a party 
regularly involved m the giving of such testimony. 
That's the subgroup. 
And then they specifically exclude physicians 
from the subgroup by saying a treating physician, for 
example, can be deposed—which they did—or called to 
testify at trial without any requirement for a written 
report. So we don't have to tell them what his opinions 
are, because they have the right to depose him, he's the 
doctor. 
Everybody that's ever been in one of these 
cases, and their law firm's been doing it longer than 
I've been alive, I think, they always know—they always 
know that the doctor is going to be asked the question: 
AD: 
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trial and then file this motion, when they could have 
asked him in the deposition. Thev are not surprised. I 
am surprised and ± am the one that will be preju 11 ri ^  r.pri 
icause itrs right They can't say they were surprised b* 
there in the records. And let me read ycu one. 
THE COURT: No, I!m—if it's there, I'll take 
your word on it. 
MR. WELLS: Yeah, it's there. He says in the 
records, I have now completed treatment for the injuries 
received in the auto accident. He says that right in 
his — 
THE COURT: But that is—you understand that's 
not what I'm concerned about. I don't know that that 
puts them on notice that his opinion is going to include 
causation. 
MR. WELLS: Well, what do we mean when we say 
"causation"? 
THE COURT: What I told you earlier. 
MR. WELLS: Is he going to be able to say that 
I was treating for in—in other words, they come m on 
the history, the first time they come in, and they say, 
We were in this auto accident and we've got this pain 
and this whatever, and h e — 
THE COURT: It's different from a history, it's 
the opinion. "Yes, m my opinion, to a reasonable 
45 
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and saving, Sergio Sr. tells me he was in an auto 
accident, gives me the following history. That! s fine 
That all comes under treatment. But when you take the 
next step and you start acting like an accident 
reconstruction expert and saying, Oh, I've treated all 
kinds of patients who have been in similar accidents to 
this and it causes injury, that is expert opinion. And 
once you go to that realm, then you have to designate 
and give those opinions. 
There's nothing in these records that gives me 
notice that he's going to go into that area. All I see 
there is a history that was taken from the patient. 
That's not an opinion on causation. 
Now, to stand here in front of the Court and to 
say, No judge has ever—I've never seen this before, 
Your Honor, that's ridiculous. This is an issue that is 
litigated all the time. It's a very hot issue right 
now, because the plaintiff's bar does not think they 
even have to designate treating doctors as experts. And 
the defense bar says, You do. 
And judges have uniformly come down and said 
they can testify to treatment but if they're going to go 
beyond their treatment and give opinions on things like 
causation, et cetera, or give opinions on other doctors 
that treated, for example, that's beyond the realm of 
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MP. WELLS: Well— 
THE COURT: --than these injuries were caused 
by the accident. That's different, so I don'z—I'm not 
talking about history. 
MR. WELLS: Well, when he says, "Patient has 
reached MMI for injuries related to the auto accident," 
what is that other than an opinion? And it's right 
there in the medical records. 
And for them to say they didn't know about in 
and it's a surprise and they can't be prepared for it, 
their own doc—their own medical expert, m her report, 
agreed and said they were hurt m this accident. So I 
don't know why we're having this motion. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I'm going to object to 
that. My doctor is not rendering an opinion on 
causation. My doctor is rendering her opinion that 
she's looked at the records, there appears to be an 
injury that was reported. She's criticizing the 
treatment that was given. 
THE CCURT: All right. 
MR. WELLS: But I asked her m her deposition--
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. 
MR. WELLS: I asked her in her deposition, Co 
you agree that they had an injury from this accidenc? 
She said, Yes. And I said, Ail you're arguing witn is 
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MR. WELLS: Yeah. And the only—okay. 
THE COURT: If he's reporting what they 
reported to him, he can do that. 
MR. WELLS: And m y — 
THE COURT: It depends on how you ask ths 
auestioi 
MR. W^LLS: Mv dilemma is that— 
MR. CKRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I'm going to 
object to further argument. I mean, it's pretty clear 
what the ruling is. I don't think it's rocket science. 
THE COURT: You watch your questions. I'll 
rely on his objections. 
MR. WELLS: All right. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
MR. WELLS: No. 
THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed? 
MR. CHRTSTSNSEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Would you escort the 
jury, please? 
(Jury enters the room.) 
THE COURT: Please be seated. The Court will 
note for the record that the jury is present ana seated. 
Both parties and counsel are likewise seated. 
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of tne jury. 
Thank you for vcur attendance toaav. We aoolocrize for 
